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Abstract
We relax the assumption that priors are common knowledge, in the standard model of games of incomplete information. We make the realistic
assumption that the players are boundedly rational: they base their actions on ﬁnite-order belief hierarchies. When the diﬀerent layers of beliefs
are independent of each other, we can retain Harsányi’s type-space, and
we can deﬁne straightforward generalizations of Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (bne) and Rationalizability in our context. Since neither of these
concepts is quite satisfactory, we propose a hybrid concept, Mirage Equilibrium, providing us with a practical tool to work with inconsistent belief
hierarchies. When the diﬀerent layers of beliefs are correlated, we must
enlarge the type-space to include the parametric beliefs. This presents
us with the diﬃculty of the inherent openness of ﬁnite belief subspaces.
Appealing to bounded rationality once more, we posit that the players
believe that their opponent holds a belief hierarchy one layer shorter than
they do and we provide alternative generalizations of bne and Rationalizability. Finally, we show that, when beliefs are degenerate point beliefs,
the deﬁnition of Mirage Equilibrium coincides with that of the generalized
bne.

1

Proem

Consider the following simple situation. Bob is competing in a Cournot duopoly
with Ann. The two of them produce perfect substitutes at zero cost and compete
in quantities. Unfortunately, the demand for their product is not known. There
are two demand forecasting agencies in town, oﬀering two diﬀerent predictions,
type 1: p = q, and type 2: p = 2q. Bob is known to use the type 1 model,1
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however, he does not know which agency Ann uses. His prior is that, with
probability α she also uses model 1 – and thus she uses model 2 with probability
1 − α. Moreover, he believes that Ann’s belief about α is described by the
probability density function γ(.). How much would/should Bob produce if this
were all the information he had available? In this paper, we would like to
convince the reader of three points:
1. The above example is representative of interesting economic situations,
which hitherto have not been rigorously analyzed by economists.
2. The reason for this apparent neglect is that the available game theoretic
models/concepts cannot adequately address these situations.
3. There is a way to deal with these situations, which is consistent in spirit
with the standard approach.

2

Introduction

In his seminal paper, János Harsányi (1967-68) invented a way to elude the
diﬃculties associated with the inﬁnite hierarchies of beliefs that arise as a consequence of asymmetric information about the payoﬀs2 in a game. His contribution was decisive in opening up the possibilities for the analysis of games of incomplete information in the ﬁeld of Economics (as it was recognized by the Royal
Swedish Academy of Sciences in 1994). However, next to the enormous beneﬁt
it created, his theory also caused the negative externality of drawing game theorists’ attention away from the analysis of higher-order beliefs.3 The convenient
assumption of priors being common knowledge – and often, even common – is
predominant not only in the literature but also in the minds of economists in
general. The aim of this paper is to complement the “Harsányi doctrine” (here
understood more generally, as the assumption of common knowledge priors) with
a less restrictive approach, which allows for the modeling of irreconcilable differences among the players’ beliefs, without sacriﬁcing tractability. That is, we
propose a level of analysis that is intermediate between Harsányi’s and Mertens
and Zamir’s (1985) treatment. The latter two authors do provide a general (in
fact, “universal”) model of belief hierarchies, however, their treatment has not
proven useful for applied analysis.
In game situations where the assumption of common knowledge priors is
inappropriate4 – that is, there are reasons to believe that the players do not
know each other’s beliefs – it is necessary to analyze the eﬀects of variations
2 As Harsányi himself argues, all other types of uncertainty (about strategy sets, number
of players etc.) can be reduced to this general case.
3 At least for a long while. See Monderer and Samet (1989), Morris, Rob and Shin (1995)
or Morris, Postlewaite and Shin (1995), for examples of recent contributions.
4 This, actually, is a very large set, encompassing all areas of economic theory. Of course,
there are many variants of the example given in the proem. The uncertainty may be about
productivity, external shocks etc. However, Industrial Organization is not the only ﬁeld for
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in the higher-order beliefs to obtain some reliable prediction/prescription about
player behavior. Once we desist from imposing common knowledge of priors, we
open up a Pandora’s box, not only because we have to explicitly consider the
maze of higher-order beliefs but mainly since we are no longer obliged to posit
that these beliefs are correct. Following the approach laid out in this paper, we
are able to model any situation where players hold higher-order beliefs which
are inconsistent with the“truth”. Such inconsistencies are all the more relevant
to investigate, since they are not only present in the static settings analyzed in
this paper, but may even persist over time (see the experimental literature on
false equilibria, for example, Camerer and Weigelt, 1991).
In a strategic situation, before deciding on what to do, a player has to predict
how her opponents will behave. To be able to do that, she has to have a belief
about her opponents’ view of the game. But they also have to do the same,
etc. and therefore, the uncertainty about the game being played generates an
inﬁnite belief hierarchy. Unless the game played is common knowledge, these
hierarchies make the analysis practically intractable. Harsányi (1967-68) has
argued that if the game itself is not common knowledge but the distribution
which each possible view(belief hierarchy)-holder – type – attaches to the space
of these types is common knowledge, we can carry out a meaningful analysis in
the context of a game of imperfect information, with the above mentioned types
as its players. This has brought us to the concept of Bayesian games. These
games are versatile, encompassing many diﬀerent types of asymmetries among
the players.
Indeed, we start our study by setting up the benchmark Bayesian game proposed by Harsányi. Having deﬁned the framework, we are then able to give the
deﬁnitions of the two salient solution concepts in this context: Rationalizability
and Harsányi’s Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (bne).
The next question has been, what if the Bayesian game played is not common
knowledge? By redeﬁning the notion of a type as one which includes the entire
belief hierarchy, Mertens and Zamir (1985) showed that, by suﬃciently enlarging
the type-space – that is, explicitly modeling more and more levels of beliefs – we
can replace the assumption of common knowledge of priors (that is, ﬁrst-order
beliefs) over the attributes by common knowledge of beliefs over this “universal”
type-space. Thus, if we substitute the attribute-space with the universal typespace, we obtain a game that is qualitatively equivalent to Harsányi’s, and in
particular is one with common knowledge “priors”. Their construction is based
on the proof that the description of a universal type contains all its beliefs,
including the one over the universal type-space. That is, common knowledge
of beliefs can be derived as a result, instead of having to assume it. While the
closedness property of the universal belief-spaces does provide the theoretical
foundations for Harsányi’s model, we claim that for applications it does not
which the analysis developed in this paper may be relevant. Consider, for example, the following: do countries know each other’s CGE models in a game of international macroeconomic
policy coordination?; do we really need noise traders for trade in equilibrium in a ﬁnancial
market?; etc.

Sákovics

Introduction

4

serve the purpose. A problem with the Mertens-Zamir types is that – unless
some regularity assumptions are made – in general,5 they are of such complexity
that they are not even describable and, therefore, they are not useful for applied
analysis. Therefore, if we want to retain the tractability of Harsányi’s approach,
we need to give a diﬀerent answer to the question asked above. This is what we
do in this paper.
The need for tractability and the absence of common knowledge leads us to
model the view of each player as a game where the players hold ﬁnite belief
hierarchies over some primitive space of attributes, which do not include beliefs.
The assumption of ﬁnite depth reasoning – apart from being very plausible –
has been corroborated by both theoretical and experimental evidence. Stahl
(1993) showed that in an evolutionary setting, a population initially composed
of players of diﬀerent depth of reasoning does not converge in general towards an
inﬁnitely smart population. Stahl and Wilson (1995) found that the hypothesis
of the presence of a “rational expectations type” in the pool of their experimental
subjects – corresponding to a player who forms unbounded belief hierarchies –
can be rejected. Nagel (1995) also demonstrated that her model of ﬁnite steps
of reasoning is consistent with the observed behavior in her experiment.
We continue our inquiry along two strands, depending on whether the diﬀerent layers of the belief hierarchy are independent. When they are, it is possible
– though not necessary – to maintain the deﬁnition of a strategy as a function exclusively of the attributes. This result follows from the reinterpretation
of higher order beliefs as beliefs over the attribute space, by “integrating out”
the rest of the variables. With this simple type-space, it is straightforward to
deﬁne the appropriate generalizations of bne and Rationalizaility (Subjective
Bayesian Equilibrium, sbe, and Partially Subjective Rationalizability, pasur,
respectively). We have found neither of these new concepts satisfactory for
application. sbe suﬀers from the caveat that it hypothesizes a strategy for the
other player, which is not consistent with the solution itself. On the other hand,
pasur is very weak, since the highest order strategic beliefs are assumed unconstrained. In order to provide an internally consistent and powerful solution
for this context, we deﬁne a hybrid concept between sbe and pasur: Mirage
Equilibrium. In a Mirage equilibrium, each player forms a strategic belief hierarchy (of the same length as the parametric belief hierarchy, which is given as
part of the description of the game). These strategic belief hierarchies satisfy
two conditions. Every layer is a best response to the next one conditional on
the parametric beliefs and, the last two layers form a sbe.
Next, we turn to the case of general (though still ﬁnite) belief hierarchies.
In this case, it is no longer possible to retain all the relevant information with
the strategies depending only on the attributes. On the other hand, if we allowed the entire belief hierarchy to form part of the strategies’ arguments, we
would run into the problem that the players would not be able to evaluate the
5 Note that we do not claim that there are no models using the universal types, which can
be parsimoniously described. Rather, that the applied analyst is likely to encounter situations,
where this is not the case.
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expected actions of their opponents because of the lack of an additional layer of
belief. This is the openness property of ﬁnite-order belief spaces. To resolve this
problem, we assume that every player believes that the other player conditions
his strategy on one fewer layers of beliefs than herself.6 This assumption clears
the way for the generalization of Rationalizability to this context, however, for
a Nash-like concept, we need to make a further choice. Note that, the above
assumption implies that when we check that two strategies are best responses
to each other, the same strategy would appear with a diﬀerent number of arguments at diﬀerent places. In order to restore the equivalence, we augment the
domain of the higher-order (and therefore the one of fewer arguments) strategic belief with the corresponding arguments of the lower-order belief. The idea
behind this rule is that this way, when the beliefs are correct we recover bne.
Finally, we carry out a consistency check between our solution concepts. To
this end, we assume that, apart from the beliefs about the underlying attributespace (that is, the ﬁrst-order beliefs), the rest of the beliefs are degenerate
point-beliefs. Calculating the solution concepts deﬁned for the general case
under this assumption, we show that the generalized bne collapses into Mirage
Equilibrium, while the generalized Rationalizability into pasur. This result
gives further credibility to the concept of Mirage Equilibrium.
We close the paper with some remarks on the diﬃculties in extending our
results to dynamic games.

3

The Standard Model

In order to ﬁx ideas, in this section we discuss Harsányi’s theory. Let us begin
with some preliminaries.
For a ﬁnite set of N players indexed from 1 to N, we deﬁne an N-person
game of incomplete information as the collection of
i) an underlying space of attributes (types), K = ×N
i=1 Ki ,
ii) a set of feasible mixed actions, S = ×N
i=1 Si ,
iii) parametric utility functions for each player, Vi = Ki × S → ,
iv) beliefs over the attribute space (priors) for each player, Ri ∈ ∆(K).
The cornerstone assumption of Harsányi’s theory is that the entire game,
including the priors, is common knowledge among the players. Consequently,
the players’ strategies are functions of (only) the attributes, σi : Ki → Si . Given
6 While we have found no direct empirical evidence for this phenomenon, it is well established that people tend to be overconﬁdent in their judgements, overrating their information
and/or abilities (see, for example, Schmalensee, 1976, Alpert and Raiﬀa, 1982, or Oﬀerman,
Sonnemans and Schram, 1996).
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a strategy proﬁle, the payoﬀ function of Player i – that is, her objective function
– is

Ui (ki , σi (ki ), σ−i (.)) =
Ri (ki , k−i )Vi (ki , σi (ki ), σ−i (k−i )) .
k−i ∈K−i

The fundamental building block for the analysis of the behavior of – even
boundedly – rational agents is their best response mapping, which we deﬁne
next.
Deﬁnition 1. The strategy of Player i, σi (.), is a best response to a proﬁle
of strategies of the rest of the players,σ−i (.) – denoted σi ∈ BR(σ−i (.), Ri ) – if
and only if for all ki ∈ Ki , σi (ki ) maximizes Ui (ki , σi (ki ), σ−i (.)) .
Remark. For the purpose of the best response mapping, σ−i (.) can also
be interpreted as a conjecture over the strategies of the players other than i,
where the probability attached to each pure strategy is the result of taking
expected values according to the original probability function, mapping mixed
strategies to probabilities.7 That is, if Player i believes, for example, that with
probability 0.4 Player j is mixing ﬁfty-ﬁfty between pure actions α and β and
with probability 0.6 she is taking pure action α, then this is equivalent to i
believing almost surely that j is mixing 0.8-0.2 between α and β.
Armed with the best response mapping, we are now ready to give the definitions of what we think of as the possible “solutions” to our Bayesian game.
In honor of its inventor, we start with Harsányi’s equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 2. The proﬁle of strategies, σ, constitutes a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium ( bne) if and only if σi ∈ BR(σ−i (.), Ri ), i = 1, 2, ..., N.
While Nash Equilibria are self-enforcing, and they are a likely limit of the
converging play in repeated games (see, for example, Kalai and Lehrer, 1993a),
they are not necessarily the best predictors of strategic interaction, especially
in a one-shot, static setting. On the other hand, if we only assume common
knowledge of rationality (conditional utility maximization) on the part of the
players, we arrive at a more natural (though less exclusive) concept of solution: Rationalizability. The extension of Bernheim’s (1984) and Pearce’s (1984)
original concept to our setting is straightforward. Let us denote by i#j(k) a
sequence of k player indices whose ﬁrst element is i, last element is j and where
no two successive elements are identical.
Deﬁnition 3. The strategy proﬁle σ(.) is Bayes Rationalizable if and only if
there exist strategy proﬁles σ i#j(k) , such that, for all i
i
(.), Ri ),
i) σi ∈ BR(σ−i

i,j
(.), Rj ) for j = i,
ii) σij ∈ BR(σ−j
i#m(n)

iii) σk

7 This

i#m(n),k

∈ BR(σ−k

(.), Rk ) for k = m, and n = 2, 3, ....

is a standard result, see, for example, Pearce (1984) for a proof.
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Here, a strategy like σji,k,i is the belief i has about k’s belief about i’s belief
about j’s strategy. Given the equivalence between point beliefs and conjectures
(c.f. the remark following the deﬁnition of the best response mapping), we
suggest, however, that it should be thought of as the point-belief i holds about
j’s strategy.
In order to assist the reader in grasping the diﬀerent information structures
and the corresponding solution concepts appearing in this paper, we will work
out as an example for each case the situation described in the Proem. For
this section, we assume that the above setup – and especially Bob’s prior –
is common knowledge (and thus γ puts probability one on α). Then the bne
strategies of the three types are given by the solution to the following system:
b = arg max q (1 − q − αa1 − (1 − α)a2 )
q

a1 = arg max q(1 − q − b)
q

(I)

a2 = arg max q(1 − 2(q + b))
q

Resolving (I) we obtain
b=

3+α
α
3−α
, a1 =
, a2 =
.
6
12
12

Because of the strategic complementarities, it is straightforward to show
that Bob has a unique rationalizable strategy and thus the set of rationalizable
strategies is a singleton for each type, coinciding with the BNE.

4

Private Beliefs

In this section, we relax the cornerstone assumption of the Harsányi theory
about the prior beliefs over the attribute space being common knowledge. As
we discussed it in the Introduction, Mertens and Zamir (1985) have generalized Harsányi’s result to this case, by enlarging the type-space. In order to
complement the Mertens-Zamir construction in a way, which is more tractable,
and also captures the bounded rationality of the players, we take an alternative
route. Our main assumption is that the players only construct ﬁnite-depth8
belief hierarchies over the attribute space. Given this restriction on the typespace, the Mertens-Zamir approach is no longer valid. Our new approach has
two strands. Like in Auction Theory, we distinguish between the cases when
information/beliefs are independent and when they are not. For simplicity, we
restrict our attention to two-player games.
The lack of common knowledge about the game being played has some direct
implications on what we require of “reasonable” solution concepts. For example,
the self-enforcing nature of equilibrium is no longer the right characteristic to
8 For notational simplicity, we assume that the belief hierarchies are composed of three
layers. The generalization to more layers is straightforward.
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look for. To see why, consider a candidate equilibrium proﬁle which is such that
all the players would be willing to follow their part if they expected the rest of the
players to play according to the candidate proﬁle (self-enforcingness); however,
in some player’s view, the strategy corresponding to some other player is not
a best response for that player to the candidate proﬁle. Clearly, equilibrium,
rationality, and the players’ beliefs are not reconcilable in this case.9 We could
try to resolve this problem by throwing away all the candidate equilibria that
carry an inner contradiction as above. However, on the one hand, this may well
leave us without an equilibrium. On the other hand, in a one-shot interaction,
even if the social norm is to play Nash, there is no reason to expect in our
setup any correlation among the players’ choice of strategies. Therefore, we
should consider each player as a separate Bayesian decision-maker (c.f. Tan and
Werlang, 1998), who chooses her action according to her own view of the world,
whether this view is correct or not. Thus, we suggest that each player should be
able to derive her “optimal” strategy via eductive reasoning. Those who expect
more collective rationality of equilibrium play can always impose a reﬁnement,
which forces strategies to satisfy the individual constraints simultaneously (c.f.
Greenberg, 1996).

4.1

Independent Beliefs

In this subsection, we assume that the diﬀerent layers of any belief hierarchy
are uncorrelated. Note that we do not rule out correlation within the same
layer: thus, a (subjective) prior distribution of the vector of attributes, or the
distribution of the vector of beliefs about the attributes need not be independent.
The most important consequence of this independence assumption is that the
conditional expectations with respect to the diﬀerent layers of beliefs can be
evaluated separately. As we will see, under this scenario we can10 maintain
Harsányi’s deﬁnition that types and attributes are equivalent, and thus players’
strategies continue to be a function of only their attributes.
More formally, let us deﬁne Player i’s beliefs as follows
Ri1 ∈ ∆(K),

Ri2 ∈ ∆ (∆(K)) ,

Ri3 ∈ ∆ (∆ (∆(K))) .

That is, Player i’s ﬁrst-order belief is a probability distribution over the
attribute space. Her second-order belief is a probability distribution over the
ﬁrst-order beliefs of Player j, etc.
Next, note that – for the purposes of (conditional) expected utility calculations, with strategies that only depend on the attributes – the beliefs described
above can be integrated out11 to yield
Ri ∈ ∆(K),

Rij ∈ ∆(K),

Riji ∈ ∆(K).

9 Note that if the game is common knowledge, this problem does not arise in equilibrium,
since whenever a player believes that another player should not follow the recommendation,
that player in fact does not.
10 Though
11 C.f.

we need not, see the next subsection.

the remark following Deﬁnition 1.
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That is, all the beliefs can be interpreted as beliefs over some player’s attribute space. In particular, Player i can “use” her second-order belief just as
if she knew Player j’s belief about her attribute. Similarly, Player i’s thirdorder belief represents the belief she thinks Player j thinks she has about his
attribute. In other words, it is as if the higher-order beliefs were all degenerate
point beliefs.
We are now ready to deﬁne the corresponding generalizations of Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium and Bayes Rationalizability.
Deﬁnition 4. Conditional on his beliefs, a strategy of Player i, σi (.), forms part
of a Subjective Bayesian Equilibrium ( sbe) proﬁle if and only if there exists a
strategy σji (.), j = i, such that
σi ∈ BR(σji , Ri ) and σji ∈ BR(σi , Rij ).
Note that, when Player i’s second-order beliefs are correct, the sets of sbe
and bne strategies (not the proﬁles!) coincide. On the other hand, sbe suﬀers
from the drawback that it does not use all the information available: it is
independent of Riji . This results in an internal inconsistency, since in Player i’s
mind, Player j does not behave according to sbe.
Deﬁnition 5. Conditional on his beliefs, a strategy of Player i,σi (.), is Partially Subjective Rationalizable ( pasur) if there exist strategies σji (.), σiij (.) and
σjiji (.), j = i, such that
σi ∈ BR(σji , Ri ), σji ∈ BR(σiij , Rij ) and σiij ∈ BR(σjiji , Riji ).
pasur does use all the information, however, it is a rather weak concept,
even when the beliefs consistent. In order to combine the strengths of sbe and
pasur, we propose the following hybrid concept instead:12
Deﬁnition 6. Conditional on his beliefs, a strategy of Player i, σi (.), forms
part of a Mirage Equilibrium proﬁle if and only if there exist strategies σji (.)
and σiij (.), j = i, such that
σi ∈ BR(σji , Ri ), σji ∈ BR(σiij , Rij ) and σiij ∈ BR(σji , Riji ).
In a Mirage Equilibrium, the highest levels of the strategic belief hierarchy constitute a sbe, while the lower levels are calculated via the backward
induction logic of pasur. This assumption has both a positive and a normative
reading. The descriptive interpretation is based on the fact that the sbe assumption is equivalent to positing that the players substitute their third-order
strategic belief about their opponent’s strategy σjiji , with their ﬁrst-order one,
σji . We claim that such a substitution is plausible. Note that what our boundedly rational agent is trying to do is to check the “consistency” of her beliefs.
12 It

is immediate that Mirage Equilibrium is a reﬁnement of pasur.
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She does that by ensuring that at every level, her strategic beliefs are a best
response to the following level, conditional on her corresponding parametric beliefs. When she attempts the veriﬁcation of her third-order strategic beliefs, she
is at a loss since there are no parametric beliefs available. In the absence of
veriﬁable third-order strategic beliefs, she could leave her second-order strategic
beliefs unrestricted as well. However, a more sensible solution is to substitute
the “missing” beliefs by the “closest” proxy available: the previous level of beliefs over the same object. This rule of thumb is consistent with the so-called
“false consensus” eﬀect found by Ross, Greene and House (1977). According to
this phenomenon, experimental subjects tend to believe that others share their
beliefs to a much larger extent than should follow from Bayesian updating.
A normative justiﬁcation of the Mirage Equilibrium concept is based on the
assumption that Nash behavior is to be desired from – even boundedly – rational agents. Consequently, they are supposed to conjecture Nash-like strategies
whenever it does not contradict their information. In our case, in the lower levels
of their (subjective) belief hierarchy the Nash conjecture would be inconsistent
with their parametric beliefs together with their opponents’ rationality. At the
top of their belief hierarchy, however, this restriction disappears and they are
free to posit Nash behavior. We oﬀer a further justiﬁcation in Subsection 4.3.
Returning to our Cournot example, it is easy to see that sbe coincides with
bne, since sbe does not use the information contained in γ(.) and, therefore,
even if it is inconsistent it does not show in the solution.
Bob’s pasur strategies can be deduced from the solutions of the following
system:


b = arg max q 1 − q − αai1 − (1 − α)ai2 ,
q

ai1 = arg max q(1 − q − bij ),
q

ai2 = arg max q(1 − 2(q + bij )),
q

 
iji
bij = arg max q 1 − q − yaiji
γ(y)dy
−
(1
−
y)a
1
2
q 

iji
= arg max q 1 − q − γaiji
,
1 − (1 − γ)a2

(II)

q

iji
where γ is the mean of γ(.), and aiji
1 ∈ [0, 1/2] and a2 ∈ [0, 1/4] are (strategically) unconstrained. Resolving (II) for b, with the extreme values of the
unconstrained strategies, we obtain:

15 − 4α − γ
16 − 4α
≤b≤
.
32
32
Note that, when α is close to 1 and γ is close to zero, the sbe strategy is
not pasur! This is because sbe does not incorporate the highly inconsistent
third-order belief.
Bob’s Mirage strategy can be deduced from the solution of the following

Sákovics

system:

Private Beliefs

11



b = arg max q 1 − q − αai1 − (1 − α)ai2 ,
q

ai1 = arg max q(1 − q − bij ),
q

ai2 = arg max q(1 − 2(q + bij )),
q


bij = arg max q 1 − q − γai1 − (1 − γ)ai2 .

(III)

q

Resolving (III) for b, we obtain:
b=

4.2

16 − 4α − 4/3γ
.
32

Correlated Beliefs

If we allow the diﬀerent layers of beliefs to be correlated, we no longer can
reduce them to distributions over the other player’s attribute. So we have to
work with
Ri1 ∈ ∆(K), Ri2 ∈ ∆(K × ∆(K)),
Ri3 ∈ ∆(K × ∆(K) × ∆(K × ∆(K))).
Note that, given a higher-order belief, the lower-order ones are redundant,
since they are given by the appropriate marginals of the higher-order belief.13
Given this more complex belief hierarchy, we need to reconsider the proper
deﬁnition of a strategy in this context. The standard approach is that the strategy mapping has as its argument all the relevant parameters of a player that
are not common knowledge, that is, the “types”. When common knowledge
is lacking, however, this rule is inappropriate. Since it is within the eductive
reasoning of a player where the others’ strategies appear, the right deﬁnition
is that a player’s strategy depends on all of the relevant parameters he has a
belief about and are not common knowledge. In other words, since our theory is
Bayesian, and thus it is based on the Savage axioms, everything whose existence
a player knows about he has a belief about and, consequently, anything a player
does not have a belief about does not exist in that player’s world. Then, obviously, he should not expect his opponents’ strategy to depend on such objects.
This deﬁnition, results in every player believing that the other player conditions
his strategy on one layer less of his belief hierarchy than herself.
Based on the above discussion, we deﬁne a strategy for Player i as σi :
Ki × ∆(K × ∆(K) × ∆(K × ∆(K))) → Si , and for Player j as σji : Kj × ∆(K ×
∆(K)) → Sj . To follow in the tradition of Nash, we can then require that players
should use strategies, which form part of a proﬁle that is autoconﬁrming given
their belief hierarchy. To choose among the many ways the model can be closed,
13 Consequently, to be precise, we need to require that the hierarchy be “coherent”, in the
sense that it does not contain inner contradictions. For more on this aspect, see Brandenburger
and Dekel (1993).
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we impose continuity, in the sense that, when beliefs are correct, our solution
should coincide with that of a model with common knowledge. Let us denote
an arbitrary belief of Player i by rim , m ≤ 3.
Deﬁnition 7. The strategy of Player i, σi (ki , ri3 ), forms part of an Third-Order
Subjective Bayesian Equilibrium ( tosube) proﬁle if and only if there exists a
strategy proﬁle σji (kj , rj2 ), such that
i) σi (ki , ri3 ) ∈ BR(σji (kj , rj2 ), ri3 ), and
ii) σji (kj , rj2 ) ∈ BR(σi (ki , ri1 × m arg∆(K)×∆(K×∆(K)) {ri3 }), rj2 ) for j = i.
The generalization of Rationalizability is more straightforward:
Deﬁnition 8. The strategy of Player i, σi (ki , ri3 ), is Third-Order Subjective
Rationalizable ( tosur) if and only if there exist strategy proﬁles σji (kj , rj2 ), σiij (ki , ri1 )
and σjiji (kj ), j = i, such that
i) σi (ki , ri3 ) ∈ BR(σji (kj , rj2 ), ri3 ),
ii) σji (kj , rj2 ) ∈ BR(σiij (ki , ri1 ), rj2 ), and
iii) σiij (ki , ri1 ) ∈ BR(σiiji (kj ), ri1 ).

Let is return to our example. Bob’s tosube strategy can be deduced from
the solution of the following system:14
b(1, y, 1, 1γ ) = arg max q (1 − q − ya(1, 1, γ) − (1 − y)a(2, 1, γ)) ,
q 
a(1, 1, γ) = arg max q(1 − q − b(1, y, 1, 1γ ))γ(y)dy,
q

a(2, 1, γ) = arg max q(1 − 2(q + b(1, y, 1, 1γ )))γ(y)dy.

(IV)

q

Resolving (IV) for b(1, α, 1, 1γ ), we obtain:
b(1, α, 1, 1γ ) =

12 − 3α − γ
,
24

which clearly coincides with his Mirage strategy, if only because the payoﬀs
depend linearly on α. As we show in the next subsection, there exists a general
equivalence result, when the belief space is further restricted.

4.3

Degenerate Higher-Order Beliefs: A Consistency Result

It is interesting to compare the solution concepts that we deﬁned for independent
and correlated beliefs. Needless to say, the latter ones can be directly applied
even if beliefs are independent. The more relevant diﬀerence is what are the
arguments of the strategies. Consequently, in order to reach a common ground
14 The arguments of Bob’s (b) and Ann’s (a) strategies are the attribute and the layers of
beliefs, while y is a dummy variable.
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between the two types of solution, in this subsection, we restrict attention to
the case when higher-order beliefs put all the mass on a single point in their
support: they are point beliefs.
Proposition 1. When higher-order beliefs are point beliefs, conditional on her
beliefs, Player i’s set of tosube strategies coincides with her set of Mirage
Equilibrium strategies, while her set of tosur strategies coincides with her set
of pasur strategies.
Proof: We only prove the ﬁrst statement, the proof of the second one is
analogous. Let us write down the system of equations,15 generated by the
iterated use of the two rules in Deﬁnition 7, which needs to be solved to calculate
Player i ’s fosbe strategy, given her beliefs, Ri3 = ki , Pi1 , Pi2 , Pi3 :





σi ki , Pi1 , Pi2 , Pi3 = arg max
Pi1 (x)Vi (ki , σ, σj x, Pi2 , Pi3 )
σ

x∈Kj






σj x, Pi2 , Pi3 = arg max
Pi2 (y)Vj (x, σ, σi y, Pi3 , Pi2 , Pi3 )
σ




3

σi y, Pi3 , Pi2 , Pi

y∈Ki

= arg max
σ





Pi3 (r)Vi (y, σ, σj r, Pi2 , Pi3 ).

r∈Kj



Here we have used the fact that the beliefs Pi2 , Pi3 are point beliefs, twice.
Once when we substituted them in directly when taking expectations, and once
when we interpreted them as beliefs over the parameter space. Next, note that
we can rewrite the above “equations” taking into account that the P’s are given,
and therefore rather than variables they are parameters. Consequently, we can
take them out of the arguments of the strategies and replace them, for example,
by sequences of player indices:

Pi1 (x)Vi (ki , σ, σji (x))
σi (ki ) = arg max
σ

σji (x) = arg max
σ

x∈Kj


y∈Ki

σiij (y) = arg max
σ

Pi2 (y)Vj (x, σ, σiij (y))



Pi3 (r)Vi (y, σ, σji (r)).

r∈Kj

But this is just the deﬁnition of Mirage Equilibrium.
15 In fact, they are not equations but best response relations, unless the latter are singlevalued. For our argument this distinction is immaterial.
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Final Remarks

In this paper, we have sketched the “gains and pains” associated with leaving
the standard paradigm of common knowledge priors. Rather than setting standards for this uncharted territory, our aim was to generate discussion, and to
encourage other researchers to investigate the issues involved. We have given a
ﬁrst approximation, the rest should be ﬁlled in by people more able than us.
An obvious extension would be to go beyond the scenario of static, normal
form games. Our analysis could be seen as part of a dynamic scenario, where
the players in each period – or at each information set – update their subjective
beliefs and play, for example, a Mirage Equilibrium strategy according to their
posteriors. The real obstacle in extending our analysis to consider dynamic
phenomena derives from the diﬃculty in characterizing the appropriate process
for updating beliefs.
Battigalli and Guaitoli (1988), Fudenberg and Levine (1993), Kalai and
Lehrer (1993b) and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1994) introduce diﬀerent versions
of Conjectural Equilibrium. This is a concept based on von Hayek’s observation
that a certain pattern of play may be stable (that is, a steady state of a learning
process) just because the players lack the necessary information to realize that
they are playing sub-optimally. Thus, in a Conjectural Equilibrium, subjective
beliefs16 are restricted endogenously: only those beliefs are allowed which are
not contradicted by the resulting play. Obviously, in the class of one-shot simultaneous move games, which are the object of this study, these endogenous
constraints are not binding.17 However, in most applications it is likely that the
players eventually get confronted with some evidence that is inconsistent with
their subjective beliefs. Of course, one should expect them to change (update)
their beliefs upon such an event. Since we were already taking into account all
the consistent strategic belief systems to derive the set of Mirage equilibria, it
follows that the exogenous beliefs will (also) have to be changed. But at which
level? Should the ﬁrst-order beliefs be modiﬁed? Or the last-order ones? Alternatively, should the magnitude of change be allocated among diﬀerent levels
of beliefs according to a more complex rule? Without a speciﬁc model at hand,
we are unable to answer these questions. In fact, even in speciﬁc examples one
is most likely forced to adopt some ad hoc rule.
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